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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
VENTURE CAPITAL IN KOREA 
CASE STUDY OF ILSHIN INVESTMENT CO. LTD. 
 
By 
 
Hyung-Chul Choi 
 
 
 
This study examines the fundamental nature of venture capital investing, the venture 
capital industry in Korea, and the case of Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd., a Korean venture 
capital firm. Venture capital is a fund that is available, usually in a form of limited 
partnership or corporate, for financing of high growth businesses in early stages of their 
life cycle, taking high risks for high returns over the long term. In typical cases, venture 
capital firms seek to invest their funds in unlisted equity or quasi-equity, and, hands-on 
value creation of portfolio companies to maximize returns. Since the first venture capital 
firm in Korea was established in 1974, the Korean venture capital industry has grown 
significantly and venture capital firms are now considered major sources of financing 
small and medium enterprises. The recent changes of the industry are characterized by 
higher competition among venture capital firms for deal sourcing and fund raising, 
relatively low concentration of funds among domestic venture capital firms, strong 
support of the Korean government, and large-cap market dominated by foreign private 
equity firms. This study also includes a case study of Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. 
(“Ilshin”) through investigation of internal data and information of Ilshin, and interview 
with the top management and the investment professionals. Overcoming strong 
regulations of the Korean government and limited opportunities in high-tech industries 
 until late 1990s, Ilshin has performed a Gross IRR of 30.2% as of March 2003 for the last 
13 years. The excellent investment performance over the long-term is attributable to 
Ilshin’s proactive deal sourcing especially in retail and film businesses and consistent 
focus on hands-on value-creation of portfolio companies.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It has been about thirty years since the first venture capital firm in Korea was 
established in 1974. Venture capital in Korea became widely recognized as an important 
financing source by entrepreneurs and one of asset classes to be invested in by large 
institutional investors. 
The industry has significantly grown on the back of development of high-tech 
businesses and the strong support of the Korean government after the economic crisis in 
1997. Driven by potential ultra-high returns from IPO (initial public offering) through the 
KOSDAQ, many venture capital firms were established, and a number of conventional 
financial institutions and individuals of high-wealth invested in early-stage companies in 
1999 and 2000. However, most of them failed to earn returns and left the market. 
Although the market is very competitive and risky, and the business process requires 
highly specialized skills, many investors were inexperienced and even did not understand 
the differences from other conventional financing businesses. 
As competition for deal sourcing and fund raising is higher than before, more 
sophisticated skills and strategies need to be studied in the Korean context. Some venture 
capital firms emerging as leading player are worth investigation as role model. 
 
Organization of this study is as follows. 
 
 The second chapter discusses basic concept of venture capital, how 
venture capital firms work at each step of investment process, and what 
venture capitalists do for higher returns. 
 
 The third chapter addresses the environment of the Korean venture capital 
firms. 
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 The fourth chapter examines the way Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. has 
grown dealing with challenges for the last 13 years and its strategic 
moves going forward. 
 
 The fifth chapter summarizes key findings and presents strategic 
implication of this study. 
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I. BASIC CONCEPT OF VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
 
1. Basic Concept of Venture Capital 
 
Venture capital means funds that are made available for financing of new or 
expanding privately held business ventures. Melvin Goldman of the World Bank 
characterizes venture capital as an investment in the form of equity or quasi-equity, 
expertise, and time contributed by the venture fund manager (or the investor) with hands 
on assistance. The investment should be long-term and carry a certain amount of risk, 
portfolios should be unlisted companies, generally relatively young or new companies, 
and the portfolios should have innovative characteristics, often linked with technology 
but not exclusively so.1 
According to the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), venture 
capitals are “means of financing a start-up, expansion or purchase of a company whereby 
the venture capitalist acquires an agreed proportion of the share capital of the company in 
return for providing the requisite funding.”2 In this definition, venture capitalists are 
equity business partner looking for more than a financial return on investment in a 
business - they plan to actively contribute to the success of the business. This definition 
makes venture capital cover funds for financing management buy-outs (MBOs)/buy-ins 
(MBIs), by adding “purchase of a company” in the range of investments. 
Venture capital operations become a combination of managerial expertise with 
equity and sometimes debt financing. Such arrangements involve the following three 
points. One is an equity participation of “outside” investors via a direct purchase of stock, 
or through warrants, options or convertible securities. The second is a long-term 
investment, which may span 1 to 10 years. The third is an active, on-going involvement 
in the investee company. 
As originally conceived, venture capital targets were mainly smaller and also 
                                                          
1 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 1 
2 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 1 
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younger companies with advanced technologies during their early stage as they are 
developing new products or services. High tech industries exhibit the characteristics, 
which appeal to venture capital firms: small, innovative, and indicating high growth 
potential. Such firms have taken a big bite out of venture capital funds in developed 
countries, despite a broader range of investment interests. Not only are there the inherent 
risks of being in early days of operation, these companies are not likely to have the 
collateral or equity base required by traditional commercial lending institutions. Special 
financing arrangements are needed and that is what venture capital attempts to satisfy.3 
Venture capital can then be best described as equity investments in businesses 
by outsiders, not the main owners. Investments are made because these businesses have 
significant growth potential that over time will yield financial returns for the investors in 
the form of dividends from profits. Dividends can be slow in coming, so the real returns 
in capital gain are anticipated through the eventual sale of the business after a period of 
some years. Little if any return is expected in the early years of the investment, quite 
unlike the traditional lending where there is continuous income from interest paid on the 
borrowing. Whereas a lending institution will assess the credit worthiness of a business 
and the secure a loan with collateral, the financial returns in venture capital financing are 
tied to the overall success of the enterprise. If the enterprises fail, the investment is lost. 
Suitable candidates for venture capital have good growth potential over the medium term 
and need a relatively high level of initial investment. Because venture capital investments 
are more risky and less liquid than most other forms of financing, the investors seek 
higher return on investments and only those private businesses with the best growth 
prospects will be selected. Before the creation of venture capital, equity investments in 
SMEs had been virtually ignored by institutional investors. Venture capital companies as 
intermediary fund managers are addressing the gap and making it attractive for many 
institutional sources of capital to commit money to private companies.4 
There is a lot of confusion between venture capital and private equity. Some in 
the investment industry use the term “private equity” to refer only to buyout fund 
                                                          
3 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 2 
4 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 1 
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investing, such as management/leveraged buyouts, mezzanine (or bridge) financing, and 
many other types of acquisition financing.5 Some of them recognize the difference in the 
expectation level of returns as an important element of a realistic identification of private 
equity, because they narrow down the meaning just to mezzanine financing. 
On the other hand, some investors have been referring to venture investing 
and buyout investing as “private equity investing.” That collides head on with the 
definition of the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) about venture capital, 
which is based on the fact that there are many venture capital firms managing buyout 
funds in EU. 
All the forms of investing mentioned above share common points in the point 
of type of investment. They all aim to equity or quasi-equity investment with relatively 
long-term and hand-on approach. In addition, in the point of institutional investment, an 
institutional investor will allocate 2% to 3% of their institutional portfolio in those kinds 
of alternative assets as part of their overall asset allocation. 
Those kinds of investing can be categorized into an investment class. Because 
the term “private equity” can be used comprehensively, it is acceptable for that purpose, 
even though some investments have been made to public (or listed) companies, or some 
of their transactions have been had in public stock exchange market. The term “venture 
capital” deserves significant distinction as earlier stage financing than other types of 
investment. 
 
 
2. Sources of Capital and Venture Capital Organization 
 
Pension funds have been the largest suppliers of venture capitals in the U.S. 
and Canada. And other significant sources are insurance companies, banks, corporate 
investors, private individuals, endowments, and foundations. (Exhibit 1-1) 
But, there are several different types of venture capital organizations classified 
by their management structure, ownership, and manner in which funds are raised for 
investment. The source of their capitals may affect both the structure of the deals in 
                                                          
5 Venture Economics, 2000 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, p. 81 
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which they invest and also the management style of the venture capital management firm 
after it has invested. There may be 3 types of organizations: independent firm, captive 
type and government organizations.6 
Independent firms may be publicly listed on a stock exchange or unlisted. 
Private firms raises their capital from more than one source, usually investment 
institutions: banks, insurance companies, pension funds, corporate investors, private 
individuals, government agencies, endowments, foundations, academic institutions, 
capital markets, etc. They are not legally connected to the organization itself, other than 
sometimes through minority share holdings. 
Captive types are specialist venture capital organizations, which are wholly 
owned subsidiaries or divisions of larger financial institution, such as banks, pension 
funds, or other financial institutions. These larger financial institutions usually provide 
the funding for their venture capital offshoots. Semi-captive firms refer to those 
organizations captive in terms of their management and ownership but are independent in 
raising funds externally to their corporate grouping. Government venture capital 
organizations are those wholly funded either directly or indirectly by government sources. 
These types of organizations may be formed as private sector profit-making 
organizations such as corporations and limited partnerships. 
Limited partnership arrangement is most frequently found in the U.S., but also 
become important in Europe and occasionally in Asia. Under a limited partnership 
arrangement, each investor purchases limited partnership interests in a venture capital 
fund placed under the management of a group of experienced venture capitalists (; the 
general partners) who charge a management fee plus a share of the capital gains as 
managers. The limited partners have only limited liability while the general partners are 
fully responsible. 
A corporate legal structure exposes the venture capital investors to only 
limited liability. Such a structure may allow for a frequent and direct involvement of 
stockholders in management through an active role on the board of directors and the 
possibility of choosing the management team. This arrangement has predominantly in 
                                                          
6 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, pp. 7-8 
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Europe and presently in developing countries.7  
 
 
 
Exhibit 1-1: Venture Capital and Private Equity Funds Commitments in the U.S., 1995- 
2001 (unit: US$ billion) 
Source:  2002 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 
 
 
3. Stages of Investment 
 
Every venture capital firm can be characterized according to how to build its 
portfolio of the investments by stages as well as by industries. But there are much more 
venture capital firms focused on later stages. In usual cases, the portion of later stages in 
the assets of venture capitals is larger than earlier stages. That is same as in total assets in 
many countries.8 (Exhibit 1-2) 
 
                                                          
7 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 7 
8 Venture Economics, 2000 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, pp. 107-108 
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Seed 
 
This stage is a relatively small amount of capital provided to an inventor or 
entrepreneur to prove a concept and to qualify for start-up capital. This may involve 
product development and market research as well as building a management team and 
developing a business plan, if the initial steps are successful. This is a pre-marketing 
stage. Seed capital requires working very closely with an entrepreneur who may have no 
more than a good idea. 
 
Start-up 
 
This stage provides financing to companies completing development and may 
include initial marketing efforts. Companies may be in the process of organization or they 
may already be in business for one year or less, but have not sold their products 
commercially. Usually such firms will have made market studies, assembled the key 
management, developed a business plan, and are ready to conduct business. 
 
Early Stage 
 
Other early stage financing includes an increase in valuation, total size, and 
the per share price for companies whose products are either in development or are 
commercially available. This involves the first round of financing following a company’s 
start-up phase that involves an institutional venture capital fund. Seed and start-up 
financing tend to involve angel investors more than institutional investors. The 
networking capabilities of the venture capitalist are used more here than in more 
advanced stages. 
 
Expansion Stage 
 
This stage involves working capital for the initial expansion of a company that 
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is producing and shipping and has growing accounts receivables and inventories. It may 
or may not be showing a profit. Some of the uses of capital may include further plant 
expansion, marketing, working capital, or development of an improved product. More 
institutional investors are more likely to be included along with initial investors form 
previous rounds. The venture capitalist’s role in this stage evolves from a supportive role 
to a more strategic role. 
 
 
Later Stage 
 
- Late Stage 
 
Capital in this stage is provided for companies that have reached a fairly 
stable growth rate; that is, not growing as fast as the rates attained in the expansion stages. 
Again, these companies may or may not be profitable, but are more likely to be than in 
previous stages of development. Other financial characteristics of these companies 
include positive cash flow. 
 
- Bridge Financing 
 
This stage is needed at times when a company plans to go public within six 
months to a year. Often bridge financing is structured so that it can be repaid from the 
proceeds of a public underwriting. It can also involve restructuring of major stockholder 
positions through secondary transactions. Restructuring is undertaken if there are early 
investors who want to reduce or liquidate their positions, or if management has changed 
and the stockholdings of the former management, their relatives and associates are being 
bought out to relieve a potential oversupply when public. 
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Exhibit 1-2: Venture Capital and Private Equity Investments by Stage in the U.S., 1980- 
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  2002 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 
 
 
4. Instrument of Investment 
 
Increasingly, investments in common stocks may be combined with other 
forms and with varying timing so that they have characteristics of equity and straight 
bond alike.9 Conventional things are preferred stock and debt with warrants or options. 
Various kinds of options can be attached to preferred stock in relation to dividend payout 
and conversion to common stock, based on its characteristic of privileged position than 
common stock. Convertible bond and bond with warrant are also popular types of 
investment, which are designed so that it may share the growth potential of the company 
using various options and warrants. 
                                                          
9 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 21 
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Typical investment instrument of venture capital is equity share of investee 
companies. Common stock allows the investor to benefit from upside potential of a 
company through stock dividends, increased stock liquidity, and finally capital gain. In 
the event of bankruptcy, common stock provides only a junior claim to assets of the firm. 
Holding majority share in ownership of the business is not one of the venture capitalists’ 
goals. Their interests are dependent upon the goals of the majority shareholders. 
But, it is also routine activity for venture capitalists to purchase senior debt 
securities, because they can often offer investors better control over the investment than 
would be available with a minority common stock position, let alone anti-dilution 
protection and tax shield effects, and liquidation preference. And also venture capitalists 
often work in conjunction with other providers of finance in putting together the total 
funding package in a variety of ways, including debt financing from other types of 
institutions like commercial banks.  
Different types of instruments are created and structured for different 
transactions, because venture capitalists would achieve control over their investments in 
order to protect their expected return. 
 
 
5. Investment Strategy 
 
It has become increasingly essential for venture capitalists to have clearly 
defined strategies for investments they will target.10 Consequently venture capital fund 
or organizations are becoming more specialized in investment strategies concerning 
business sectors, stages of investment, regional preferences, and size of each transaction. 
Some venture capital funds have highly polished strategies describing detailed 
characteristics of expected investees, such as sales volume and capital size, and deal 
structures defining investment instruments, ownership, and monitoring policy. 
The sources of their funds are no longer willing to rely on simple 
opportunistic judgments by venture capitalists in the increasingly complex marketplaces 
                                                          
10 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 9 
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where knowledge and familiarity with such markets, the competitors and other critical 
factors are essential to effectively place an investment. They want such focus to ensure 
that the venture capitalists maintain a current expertise that is more and more critical to 
the investment decision and the subsequent monitoring of the investment. And also they 
would balance their placements to differing types of opportunities.  
Such strategies are also considered necessary by the prospective investee. 
More and more companies inviting investors from outside distinguish the quality of 
capital much better than before. They expect competent venture capitalists to contribute 
to their overall business so that they grow faster than their competitors. Venture 
capitalists can develop and maintain their expertise for adding value to their investee 
companies by focusing on specific areas. 
 
 
6. Phases of Investment Process 
 
There are 3 basic phases to the venture capital investment process. The first is 
decision stage where a decision must be made as to the entry of a venture capital firm 
into a particular investment. The second is the operating stage where the venture capital 
firm has entered a deal and began monitoring management. Venture capitalists minimize 
losses and maximize gains through an advisory role and by providing any necessary new 
financing while assisting the entrepreneur in making the firm more professional and 
attractive for outside investors. The third is the exit stage where the investors will seek to 
profit from their investment. 
The process typically involves the components that follow, each of which has 
its objective to enhance the quality of deals to review by filtering out those deals that are 
concluded not to meet the venture capitalists' strategic objectives.11 Often one of the 
various stages, while its conclusions may necessarily need to be reached in a certain 
sequence in this filtering process, may actually be undertaken before or after another 
stage. This overlap ensures the most efficient linking of information and judgments 
                                                          
11 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 11 
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between them, as well as the most effective use of the venture capitalists' time and 
resources. 
 
 
Deal Flow 
 
Healthy deal flow is one of the most critical resources of venture capitalist. It 
is a key factor in determining investment strategy and also attracting fund sources. 
Without a healthy deal flow venture capitalists will not only have difficulty successfully 
placing the funds at their disposal in viable deals and doing so in the time frame, but will 
tend also to obtain deals with consequent adverse impact on pricing as well as deal 
quality. 
Developing a healthy deal flow takes significant investment of their time and 
effort, because deal flow is primarily a function of personal relationships or networking. 
Fostering such relationships and network to create deal flow means making the effort to 
become known as an approachable and professional venture capital firm to people in 
related business to expected investees, other professionals in investment baking, 
commercial banking, accounting, legal service, and venture capital itself. They would 
provide referral and sometimes syndication opportunities.12 
 
 
Screening Deals 
 
Given a respectable deal flow, it is obviously necessary to perform a filtering 
process. It is quick decision by venture capitalists without spending too much of time or 
effort before due diligence. Venture capitalists determine whether a prospective 
transaction may be viable to justify further consideration and fits the investment strategy. 
Critical questions about the investment are raised in this stage. Some of them 
are confirmed before due diligence, and those that don’t fit the investment strategy or 
                                                          
12 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 11 
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marginal ones are discarded. Questions that need to be verified from due diligence are 
defined for the investments that will be processed more. 
The most important factor in the overall evaluation of an investment is the 
investee’s managerial qualification. Other typical questions are about objectives of 
financing, time span to get return from capital gains, contemplated way out of the 
investment, important factors that will affect the industry, market opportunity of the 
products or services, projected sales and profit, etc.13 
 
 
Valuation and Pricing 
 
The next step is the financial valuation process to assess the justifiable pricing, 
both to determine if prospective return fits the strategic financial objectives as well as in 
preparation for eventual negotiation. Typically it works as the next filter in the process 
before the expensive and time consuming due diligence process is undertaken in any 
depth. 
At this stage venture capitalists calculate expected return from the investments. 
Venture capitalists discard deal which is not expected to bring enough return with 
acceptable risks. However attractive the investment is in its business quality, venture 
capitalists decline it if proposed pricing doesn’t seem to be negotiable one. 
Venture capitalists would assess the investment as precisely as possible. Many 
valuation methods are used by venture capitalists. Valuation using various multiples, such 
as price earning ratio (PER), price sales ratio (PSR), price book-value ratio (PBR), and 
EV/EBITDA, is the most simple and useful way in many cases. Another way of valuation 
is calculation of expected rate of return. IRR is mostly popular method. But, as an 
investee company is earlier stage is, most of data showing current status is less 
meaningful. So valuation of those companies largely depends on venture capitalists’ 
perspective on the business. 
Proposed pricing is rarely comfortable for venture capitalists. Normally 
                                                          
13 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, p. 12 
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management teams of investee companies are highly optimistic and confident in their 
business, and they want to dilute their share at the minimum level. Competition among 
venture capitals and bullish stock exchange market enlarge valuation gap between 
assessed and proposed pricing by enhancing expectation level of investee companies.  
Negotiation of pricing is inevitable process in most transactions, and venture 
capitalists determine how much the gap may be shortened from negotiation and how 
much it can be compensated by investment structure.14 
 
 
Due Diligence 
 
This stage involves the careful review of features and details of the investment. 
It is a complicated and time consuming process dealing with legal, financial and 
management aspects. Venture capitalists solve the problems and questions raised at the 
former stages, anticipate any possible problems that might arise after investment, and 
gain confidence in the transaction. 
In the legal aspect, venture capitalists examine all legal documents or 
contingent legal problem that might have an impact on the performance and potential 
liability of the company. Financial due diligence is a continuing process of inquiry and 
reappraisal from the first introduction of the company to completion of the deal. Outcome 
of venture capitalist’s scrutiny is crystallized into forecasted financial number. 
In the management due diligence, quality of management team, characteristics 
of the product, the technology used and its vulnerability, and the market potential of a 
company is identified through comprehensive reference check. Venture capitalists 
interview with suppliers, customers, existing or potential competitors, and industry exert 
using their extensive network. 
Venture capitalists give different weight on each issue according to 
characteristic of the business or transaction, so the due diligence of each transaction is 
conducted in quite different way. If a venture capitalist doesn’t have expertise in some 
                                                          
14 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, pp. 13-14 
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area, professionals from outside, such as accounting and law firm, are often used to 
assess the investment. But, quality of management team is considered the most important 
points by most venture capitalists.15 
 
 
Deal Structuring 
 
Deal structure is a set of arrangements negotiated between the investee 
company and the venture capitalist with the objective of reconciling their different needs 
and concerns with respect to a specific deal. The issues to be settled are the kind and mix 
of financial instruments to be used, pricing of the deal, and other terms of the agreement, 
such as warranties and covenants. 
Venture capitalists have a different set of concern from the investee company 
when negotiating the structure of the deal. These includes earning a reasonable return 
given the level of risk in the transaction, having sufficient influence on the development 
of the company usually through board representation, minimizing tax payments resulting 
from the cash flows of the deal, assuring liquidity in the future, having voting control to 
be able to replace management in case of consistent bad performance, and the like. 
The investee company looks for structure protecting their interests, such as 
ability to lead the business they are establishing, receiving reasonable financial returns 
for their initiative, having a flow of resources adequate to run their business, and 
minimizing tax exposure. 
Venture capitalists structure the investment in order to ensure that they enter in 
the best possible position to insure that your objectives are achieved in the most efficient 
manner. They would achieve control over their investment to protect their expected return 
as well as to avoid any unnecessary liabilities. 
Syndication of deal may be structured, considering size of the investment, 
potential risk, existing exposure to a particular sector, or regulatory and accounting 
liabilities. Venture capital benefits from getting chances to participate in other syndicated 
                                                          
15 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, pp. 15-20 
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deal as well as limiting individual risk. And, the investee company benefits from limiting 
outside control, being offered combined business expertise, and inducing larger amount 
of investment.  
 
 
Negotiating and Closing 
 
In this stage venture capitalists negotiate with investee companies on pricing 
and deal structure. It is very tough process for both parties. Actually more parties, such as 
other investors, existing shareholders, deal introducers, and advisers, may have their own 
interests on the transaction. But, the key is a successful and mutually beneficial 
relationship that will last for a long time. Both parties prepare and review all related 
documents and close the transaction. 
 
 
Proactively Managing the Portfolio Investments 
 
After closing the transaction, venture capitalists get into the long-term value 
creation process which is to bear superior return. Each venture capitalist decides the 
degree to which to manage each individual investment. Some prefer to rely on 
management reports and periodic company visits, while others prefer more pro-active 
role in the areas of future financial arrangements, strategic decision, planning 
development, marketing and personnel issues. These kinds of active involvement are 
mostly performed through membership on the board of directors. 
Funds or fund sources may demand certain level of involvement. Most 
investors hope venture capitalists will spend more time improving the performance of 
their current portfolios rather than attempting to raise new funds as soon as they are fully 
invested. In many cases, monitoring policy is stipulated in contracts or investment 
strategy. 
More competent venture capitalists have superior expertise, more experiences, 
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a stronger international network for assisting the investee company in professionalizing 
the firm as well as financing additional capital. And also venture capitalists may play a 
decisive role in relieving investee companies of difficult situation. If their activities 
benefit the investee companies and they bring higher return, they will have easier time 
raising funds at a later time. Capable venture capitalists are differentiated in that way. 16 
 
 
Exits 
 
Exiting from the investment is the last stage of venture capital process 
realizing return from the investment. It is quite usual for venture capitalists to gradually 
decrease their shares as realizing partly. An excellent transaction should provide a 
flexible choice of exit routes that would make venture capitalists promptly respond to the 
situation. There are five main exit mechanisms: listing on public stock exchange market, 
trade sale, refinancing, repurchase, and involuntary exit. 
Listing on stock market is the most common and profitable route for venture 
capital, and has several advantages. 
First, a growing company can raise more capital by marketing the company 
shares on the stock market. Listed companies can raise additional capital by further issues 
of shares, normally by way of right issues to existing shareholders. 
Second, listed companies can finance expansion through an offering of its 
own shares in payment in the acquisition of other business operations. An offer of shares 
may allow the negotiation of a more favorable price, since the seller may be able to defer 
tax liabilities on capital gain. 
Third, once shares are publicly held, the shareholders can realize the value of 
shareholding easier by selling their holding. It is possible for venture capitalists, or other 
shareholders to realize part of it while still maintaining a significant stake in the business 
if desired. And also, better price may be available in this way, than through a private sale 
if the company had not gone public. Of course, the owner can also get the same chances. 
                                                          
16 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, pp. 27-29 
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Forth, employees can get a much greater incentive through employee share 
ownership programs or stock option, since the employees can more easily value their 
holding in the company. They can also sell their shares more readily if they wish to 
realize a gain. 
Fifth, a company will enhance its status with consequent impact in its markets 
once shares are publicly traded. Public awareness and visibility to brokers or investors are 
also considerably enhanced. 
Disadvantages can include the possible loss of control or unwelcome bids, 
burdensome disclosure requirements, increased scrutiny from shareholders and the press, 
perceived emphasis on short-term profits, and high costs of gaining quotation. 
Trade sale is also the most common way, especially in the U.S. (Exhibit 1-3) It 
is accompanied with acquisitions or strategic investments. Therefore, the third parties 
may well be strategic investors. Even though it generates smaller return than IPO, it is 
popular form of exit, because it is appropriate for relatively small companies that because 
of their size are not attractive to the large institutional investors. 
Refinancing of the investee company can give an exit route, if they are willing 
to purchase the venture capitalists’ share. This can occur when the venture capitalist is 
looking for an exit but the investee company is unwilling to go for a listing or a trade sale. 
Repurchase of the venture capitalists’ shares by the investee company or its 
management can also an exit route. But, this is limited when the company or the 
management has grown enough to buying the shares. Or, it can occur based on 
investment structure agreed upon between the investee company and the venture 
capitalists, in example, if the company doesn’t meet managerial targets. If large 
institutional investors take liabilities on the repurchase provisions, they will buy the 
venture capitalists’ shares. 
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Exhibit 1-3: Exit of Venture Capital by Type in the U.S., 1990-1999 (unit: US$ million) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Money Tree US Report Q2 2000 Results 
 
 
 
Involuntary exit occurs under receivership or liquidation. Write-off of 
investments is not unusual for venture capitalists at all. 
However well a portfolio company has performed in various aspects, for 
example, high profitability, stable revenue stream, strong balance sheet, and established 
market position, poor exit strategy cannot ensure corresponding returns from the 
investment. Therefore, exit strategy for each portfolio companies should be considered 
when conducting due diligence, structuring the investment, and negotiating terms and 
conditions.17 In addition, it is clear that one of most important post-investment activities 
is to continuously look for better exit opportunities. 
 
                                                          
17 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment. “The Fundamentals of Asian Private Equity Investing”, 
1999, pp. 32-36 
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE KOREAN VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
1. Historical Background of the Korean Venture Capital Industry 
 
In 1974, Korea Technology Advancing Corporation (KTAC), which is now 
Kibo Capital, was established by KIST (Korea Institute Science and Technology) as the 
first venture capital organization in Korea. Its business was to provide capital for simple 
commercialization of outputs of R&D of KIST. In 1981, the Korean government initiated 
foundation of Korea Technology Development Corporation (KTDC), which is now KTB 
Network. Korea Development Investment Corporation (KDIC), which is now TG Venture, 
and Korea Technology Financing Corporation (KTFC), which was now KDB Capital, 
were founded in 1982 and 1984, respectively. The venture capital firms established in the 
early 1980s were considered a means of supporting economic development plan of the 
Korean government rather than an independent business pursuing profits. They were not 
active in financing start-ups and early-stage companies and focused on providing debt 
capitals to areas that the government intended to support, such as heavy machinery and 
chemical industries, instead. 
It was after legislation of ‘Law of Start-up Support Financing’ and ‘Law of 
New Technology Support Financing’ in 1986 that the Korean venture capital firms had 
been incentivized by preferential tax benefits and the first privately-owned venture 
capital firm was established. The companies established in that period include Korea 
Technology Investment Corporation (KTIC), Dongwon Venture Capital, and Hanmi 
Technology Investment Company. At the same time, the stock exchange market was 
activated from the mid 1980s. Venture capital firms expected to have better exit route 
through IPO. 53 venture capital firms were established until in 1991. 
In 1991, OTC (over-the-count) market opened for the purpose of trading 
stocks issued by small and medium enterprises. But, it did not work efficiently until the 
KOSDAQ (Korea Securities Dealers Association Automated Quotations) opened in 1996. 
After that, some high-tech companies were successfully listed on the KOSDAQ:  
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Medison (January 1996), Haan Soft (September 1996), and Mirae Corporation 
(November 1996). More venture capital firms were established, and the investment 
amount for high-tech companies increased sharply. But, the large portion of investments 
was close to mezzanine-stage investment or pre-IPO deals aiming for short-term IPO 
margin. 
After economic crisis in December 1997, the venture capital industry froze 
and there were no financing sources for entrepreneurs except for foreign investors. 
Foreign venture capital and private equity firms started to actively invest in Korean 
companies. Rationale of their investments was low valuation of companies and prospects 
for appraisal of KRW currency. They focused on large-cap deals over USD 30 million in 
distressed situation, and therefore, start-up and early-stage companies were not their 
investment targets. That was beginning of private equity industry in Korea. 
Promotion of venture companies was one of the key policy measures for 
overcoming economic crisis. The government adopted indirect financing through venture 
capital firms and limited partnerships as opposed to direct financing in the past, 
encouraged domestic pensions and endowments to invest in venture capital, and 
expanded tax benefit for venture capital investing. Those strong supports of the 
government, bullish stock exchange market, Internet fever, and increased 
entrepreneurship were key factors that contributed to substantial growth of venture 
capital investing in 2000. The number of venture capital firms and limited partnerships 
increased drastically, and conventional financial institutions, corporations in other fields, 
individuals generally called angel investor were also looking for opportunities for 
investing in high-tech start-ups, expecting high returns. But, after the collapse of stock 
exchange market in 2000, many players left the market, and the Korean venture capital 
industry went into a fast decline following worldwide trend. 
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Exhibit 2-1: Economic Growth and Exit Market 
 
A.  Nominal GDP (unit: KRW Trillion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Bank of Korea 
 
B. KOSPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Korea Stock Exchange 
 
C.  KOSDAQ Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  KOSDAQ Securities Co. 
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2. Regulatory Environment of the Korean Venture Capital Industry 
 
To be a venture capital firm in Korea, government license is required by law. 
There are two types of venture capital firm in Korea: Small Business Investment 
Company (“SBIC”) and New Technology Support Financing Company (“NTSFC”). The 
major difference between the two types is that NTSFCs are allowed to invest in more 
various instruments and assets, including straight bond, lease, and factoring, and venture 
capital is one of businesses of NTSFCs. But, those two compete for a market and their 
venture capital businesses are equally regulated and supported by the government. Below 
is a summary of featured regulations for SBIC. 
 
Exhibit 2-2: Regulatory Environment of SBIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Korean Venture Capital Association 
 
Noteworthy aspects among the listed above are that SBIC should be a 
corporation with a minimum requirement of paid-in capital, currently KRW 10 billion 
and that acquiring controlling shares of portfolio companies (over 50% of ownership) is 
prohibited. Recently, the Korean government selectively adopted the standards of the 
U.S., for example, call-basis drawdown of committed capital as opposed to initial full 
drawdown, and general partner in the form of Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) as 
Venture Capital Firm
(General Partner)
Limited Partnership
 Government license required by law
 Minimum paid-in capital of KRW 10 billion
 Acquisition of stock not to exceed 50% of shares with voting rights
 Mandatory time frame of investment:  To invest at least 20%, 30%, and 50% of paid-in capital 
within the fist one, two and three year period, respectively
 Restriction against investment in large enterprises and listed companies
 On-shore fund
 Minimum GP contribution:  5-15% of total commitment
 Initial full drawdown
 Mandatory time frame of investment:  To invest at least 20%, 30%, and 50% of total commitment 
within the fist one, two and three year period, respectively
 Restriction against investment in large enterprises and listed companies
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opposed to corporation. 
 
 
 
3. Overview of Major Players in the Korean Venture Capital Industry 
 
 
Small Business Investment Company (“SBIC”) 
 
As of June 2000, there are 134 SBICs, and total assets under management are 
KRW 8.3 trillion. Average fund size is around KRW 62 billion, but the concentration is 
very high. As a proxy data, average fund size was KRW 36 billion as of September 2000, 
and 25 venture investment companies accounted for 62% of total fund. Currently, the 
concentration of funds to leading venture capital firm is higher than that in 2000, as 
competition for fund raising gets stronger and typical size of a limited partnership to be 
launched is larger. 
The fund sources are mostly paid-in capital of SBIC (46%), limited 
partnership accounts for 39%, and debt financing accounts for 23% of total funds. 
Comparing with the U.S. and other developed countries, the portion of debt financing is 
large, mainly because providing loan to SBICs at a low interest rate is still an important 
policy measure of supporting venture companies. 
The fund sources of limited partnership are diversified. Corporation is the 
largest fund source accounting for 29%, and the government is the second (18%). But 
pension funds and foundations account for only 2%. The portion of limited partnership in 
total capital under management is expected to grow as pensions and foundations allocate 
more to venture capital class and invest more in limited partnerships. 
Korean venture capital firm predominantly invests in equity (59.6%), and 
investments in convertible bond and bond with warrant (23.2%) or other types of 
investment (17.6%) are relatively small. Recently, various types of preferred shares that 
enable more flexible deal structuring are preferred to common shares. 
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Exhibit 2-3: Number of Small Business Investment Companies, 1986-2002 1H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Korean Venture Capital Association 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2-4: Concentration of Capital, 2000 Q3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Data from Korean Venture Capital Association 
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Exhibit 2-5: Aggregate Fund Size, 1998-2002 1H (unit: KRW trillion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Korean Venture Capital Association 
 
 
Exhibit 2-6: Organization of Limited Partnerships by Year, 1997-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Korean Venture Capital Association 
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Exhibit 2-7: Limited Partners by Type, June 2001 (Total = USD 2.16 billion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2-8: Investment by Industry, 2002 (Total = KRW 565 billion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2-9: Investment by Type, 2002 (Total = KRW 565 billion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Korea Venture Capital Association 
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Individuals (Angel Investors) 
 
In 1997, angel investors emerged as another group of investors in the Korean 
venture capital industry. Total amount of angel funds substantially increased to around 
KRW 29 billion in 2000, and much more amount of capital was directly invested in 
unlisted companies. However, unlike typical angel investors in the U.S investing in start-
up companies, angel investors in Korea pursued later stage or pre-IPO investment. 
Venture companies also prefer institutional investors to individuals, since investee 
companies expect more than money from investors. Therefore, as venture capital industry 
became more competitive, angels had more difficulty in deal sourcing18. Recently, few 
individual invest in venture companies, but, still remains potential large sources of 
venture capital. 
 
 
Exhibit 2-10: Korean Angels 
 
 1997 1998 1999 March 2000 
Number of angels 105 349 4,253 15,371 
Investment Size 
(unit: KRW billion) 1     2 52 101 
Angel Fund Organized 
(unit: KRW billion)   14 29 
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration, Venture White Paper 
 
 
Corporates 
 
As it is the case in other developed countries, corporate are one of the largest 
sources of venture capital in Korea. Many corporate investors began to directly invest in 
venture companies in 1999 and 2000. For example, Korean four largest chaebols 
                                                          
18 Small and Medium Business Administration. Venture White Paper, p114. 
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announced that they would invest around KRW 1 trillion in venture companies for the 
next three years in 200019. 
The rationale of their direct investments is potential of strategic synergies with 
their existing businesses in most cases. Therefore, corporate investors are usually more 
patient about exits than financial investors and are inclined to expand their existing 
businesses even at the sacrifice of financial returns. 
Because the government do not provides corporate investors with preferential 
benefits, large corporate investors establish their subsidiary venture capital firms or 
simultaneously invest indirectly in limited partnerships managed by existing venture 
capital firm, and smaller investors usually indirectly invest through limited partnerships. 
 
Exhibit 2-11: Venture Investment Plan Announced by Chaebols (unit: KRW billion) 
 
Chaebol Company Amount 
Samsung Samsung Corporation 30
 Samsung Electro-Mechanics 20
 Samsung Venture Investment Company 300
Hyundai Hyundai Corporation 10
 Hyundai Electronics -
 Hyundai Venture Investment Corporation 28
LG LG International -
SK SK 10
 SK Global 10
 SK Telecom 18
 SK Evertec 5
Source:  Hyundai Research Institute (www.hri.co.kr) 
 
 
Financial Institutions 
 
Venture capital is also an attractive product to large financial institutions that 
manage huge amount of assets, because expected return is higher and correlation to 
public financial market is lower than conventional asset classes. In 2000, many financial 
                                                          
19 Heung-Ki Baek,, Current Status of Venture Investment of Korean Large Corporations, www.hri.co.kr 
(Hyundai Research Institute) 
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institutions, such as commercial banks, securities firms, pensions, and insurance 
companies, began to directly invest in venture companies. They competitively allocated 
certain portion of their assets to venture capital and set up in-house management teams 
dedicated to direct investment. 
However, their organizational culture and process in many aspects including 
due diligence, decision making, and post-investment management, have been primarily 
for eliminating high risks from their portfolios rather than for taking and actively 
managing risks. They tried to adopt and internalize new systems for their venture capital 
business, but that would not be achieved in a short time frame. 
Some large financial institutions established subsidiary SBICs or NTSFCs, but 
in most cases they invest indirectly through limited partnerships managed by venture 
capital firms and directly invest by selectively participating in consortiums led by venture 
capital firms. 
 
Exhibit 2-12: Fund for Venture Investment Announced by Major Banks (unit: KRW billion) 
 
Bank Amount 
Korea Development Bank 150
Kookmin Bank 100
Industrial Bank of Korea 100
Cho Hung Bank 50
Shinhan Bank 30~40
Source:  En@ble 
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III. CASE STUDY OF ILSHIN INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. (“Ilshin” or “the Company”) is one of the leading 
venture capital firms in Korea. The performance of Ilshin for the last 13 years is 
surprising. Since established in 1990, Ilshin has recorded net profits for 13 consecutive 
fiscal years and an IRR of 30.2% as of March 2003. Ilshin has managed or has advised 13 
limited partnerships, the total commitment of which amounts to KRW 189.2 billion and 
has made 105 investments worth KRW 117.1 billion. Those performances of Ilshin over 
the long-term rank among the best in the Korean venture capital industry. 
Ilshin has invested mainly in information technology, retail, and movie sectors. 
Unlike many venture capital firms in Korea focusing solely on information technology, 
Ilshin has accumulated experiences and expertise in retails and movie sectors. Ilshin’s 
success cases in Giordano Korea (retailing casual apparel) and Body Shop Korea 
(retailing cosmetics) are unique in the Korean venture capital industry. That approach of 
Ilshin is worth studying as a role model for Korean venture capital firms. This part is to 
analyze what are the key factors to Ilshin’s unparallel success and its investment strategy 
facing major issues going forward. 
 
 
2. Early Stage (1990 ~ 1993) 
 
Establishment and Recruitment of Key Members 
 
Ilshin was founded by Ilshin Spinning Co., Ltd. in 1990. Ilshin Spinning has 
been a leading spinning company in Korea since it was founded in 1951. Focusing on its 
core businesses since its establishment, Ilshin Spinning has been stable and strong 
financially until now. In 1990, Ilshin Spinning decided to get into financial industry, and 
established Ilshin as the first step. In 1991, it recruited Jeong-Suk Koh as president who 
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is a family member of Ilshin Spinning. Before joining Ilshin, he had worked for a leading 
management consulting company, McKinsey & Co., as a consultant. By the end of 1991, 
Ki-Min Nam and Seung-Bum Kim joined Ilshin. Ki-Min Nam had been experienced in 
launching and building up start-up businesses by running his own businesses during his 
college days, and Seung-Bum Kim had been a consultant in a leading management 
consulting company, Monitor Company. All of the three founding members studied 
management in graduate schools. 
 
 
Participation by Foreign Capital and Formation of Limited Partnerships 
 
Ilshin’s active businesses with foreign investors already began in its early days. 
Sit/Kim International, a venture capital in the U.S., has been a shareholder of Ilshin since 
Ilshin acquired and merged with Samdo Venture Capital in 1993. Ilshin also succeeded to 
a limited partnership of Samdo Venture Capital, to which Sit/Kim International has 
contributed significant amount of capital. The second and the third partnerships were 
launched in 1993, and total fund size amounted to KRW 27.7 billion as of December 
1993. Bankers Trust participated in the second partnership, which is the first venture 
investment partnership in Korea that was invested in by a major foreign investor. 
Though fund raising was very active compared with other venture capital firm, 
Ilshin’s investing was not the exception. For the first four years, Ilshin conducted just 
seven equity deals, and the total size of investments was only KRW 1.4 billion. And there 
were no successful investments. That was common among venture capital firms in early 
1990s. Investment opportunities were scarce mainly due to lack of entrepreneurship and 
underdeveloped high-tech industries. Risk was too high, and, in contrast, expected return 
from investment was too small. Like other venture capital firms, Ilshin invested a lot in 
bridge financing. 
 
 
3. Building Core Competences (1994 ~ 1997) 
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In this period, the unfavorable environment did not change in overall. That is 
evidently proved by the fact that there were no venture capital firms established in 1994 
and 1995. Over-the-count (OTC) stock exchange market before the opening of the 
KOSADQ didn’t work as a market, and deal opportunities are scarce. But, Ilshin built up 
its core competences in retail and movie sectors and expanded to information 
technologies and media sectors. 
 
 
Investments in Retail Businesses 
 
Despite Ilshin’s continuous efforts to find investment opportunities in high-
tech industries, Ilshin could not consummate any quality high-tech deals until it invested 
in Ace Antenna in 1995. Potential start-ups and early-stage companies were scarce in the 
market. Ilshin’s professionals realized that their academic and professional backgrounds 
did not fit high-tech areas. They thought that their network and capability for deal 
sourcing, due diligence, and value creation for high-tech deals needed to be established 
over the long-term. 
Investment in Giordano Korea in 1994 was based on the judgment of Ilshin’s 
professionals about their resources and capabilities. Obviously, retail business in Korea is 
not a fast growing sector. But, value creation by Ilshin’s professionals could be more 
effective in retail sectors than in other sectors. They noticed that Ilshin Spinning had 
supplied threads for many years to Giordano, a branded retailer of casual apparel in Honk 
Kong. Ilshin started thorough market researches including customer analysis, competitor 
analysis, and potential value creation, and decided to establish intro duce Giordano in 
Korea. Ilshin was confident of great opportunity for marketing middle-price casual 
apparel, as a niche market. After the decision, Ilshin directly approached Giordano 
through its network based on Giordano’s relationship with Ilshin Spinning, and indirectly 
made Ilshin referred by a venture capital in Hong Kong. Ilshin’s exhaustive investigation 
and preparation for doing the business in Korea moved the top management of Giordano. 
Ilshin and Giordano decided to launch business in Korea. Each party invested KRW 2.5 
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billion at a ratio of 50:50 in ownership. Jun-Seok Han, who advised Ilshin on the overall 
process as an industry expert, was appointed as CEO of the new company jointly 
established by Ilshin and Giordano. 
From the start-up stage of Giordano Korea, Ilshin actively took part in the 
major decisions. Ilshin recruited Jong-Ho Park, and sent him to Giordano Korea as a full 
time secondee responsible for close monitoring. Ilshin’s contribution was mainly about 
building marketing strategies, such as establishment of effective distribution channels. 
For instance, Giordano Korea was the first middle-price casual apparel brand that opened 
shops in major department stores. The shops in department stores need to be spacious 
enough to give customers impression of quality brand. That kind of effort was 
accompanied by narrowing down products line-up, key of which is careful quality control. 
Another key strategy was to control inventory turnover. By drastically cutting down 
turnover days through real-time data transmission from shops to headquarter, it could 
maintain competitive pricing and constant sales volume, and was not pressured by regular 
bargain sale which was common among casual apparel brands in Korea. 
Those effective strategies led by Ilshin was based on thorough due diligence 
of Ilshin’s professionals. Sales volume has grown by 140% annually on average, even 
during economic crisis in 1997 and 1998. Return on investment in Giordano Korea is 
expected to be over 18 times of initial investment amount. 
Based on experiences in Giordano Korean, Ilshin made a series of investments 
in retail sectors, including Body Shop Korea (cosmetics, 1996), Topko (ladies apparel, 
1996), Blue Elim (upholstery, 1996), and Madarina Duck (accessories, 1997). Jong-Ho 
Park took charge of Body Shop Korea and Madarina Duck, and became a full time 
secondee at Body Shop Korea. Post-investment activities of Ilshin were always hands-on 
as is the case with Giordano Korea. And Body Shop Korea is expected to be another great 
success following Giordano Korea. 
 
 
Investments in Movies 
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In 1996, Ilshin decided to invest in movies, and Seung-Bum Kim took 
responsibility for the sector. It was Ilshin’s first step toward media and contents sectors 
that are currently a major category of target sectors. The background of Ilshin’s decision 
is that Ilshin’s role in value creation was clearly defined upfront. 
Ilshin identified investment opportunities in production and distribution of 
quality Korean movies in consideration of increasing income-level, high growth potential 
of the movie market, and increasing demands for quality Korean movies as well as short 
investment cycle of movie project investments. 
Ilshin also noticed that the Korean movie industry is closed and under-
developed in many ways but could be more industrialized within short period of time if 
supported by active investments by financial investors and more thoughtful production 
based on systematic approach. After Ilshin’s pioneering investment in movies and the big 
success of “The Contact” in 1997, movie investments by financial investors and 
production of Korean movies have sharply increased and the market share of Korean 
movies has also increased from 20% level in 1995 to 50% level in 2002. 
Ilshin often participated in all phases of movie production from planning and 
preproduction to marketing and distribution for the purpose of putting more emphasis on 
commercial aspects of a movie and systematic approach to identify customers’ demands 
and inclination. In 1995, Ilshin formed a consortium with Kookmin Venture Capital and 
invested in “Ginkgo Bed”. Nationwide admissions of Ginkgo Bed were around 680 
thousand, a record high number, and Ilshin gained 81.78% rate of return from just one 
year investment. 
 
 
Active Fund Raising and Investment in High-Tech Areas 
 
Though environment for investment was still unfavorable and fund raising 
from domestic institutions was virtually impossible, Ilshin launched four limited 
partnerships from 1995 to 1997 by raising KRW 62.3 billion, significant portion of which 
came from large foreign institutions. Through international and proprietary network of 
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Ilshin’s professionals, Ilshin targeted and approached large foreign investors who were 
thought to have interests in the Korean venture capital market and long-term growth 
potential of the Korean high-tech industries. 
Salomon Brothers participated in Ilshin No. 4 Venture Investment Partnership 
as a major limited partner, Itochu Corporation in Ilshin No. 5 Venture Investment 
Partnership, and Capital Balanced Fund in Ilshin No. 6 Venture Investment Partnership 
and Ilshin No. 7 Venture Investment Partnership, respectively. The amount of seven 
limited partnerships managed by Ilshin was KRW 90 billion in total. 
Ilshin needed more professionals with diverse backgrounds for efficient 
management of the new limited partnerships. Expertise in technologies or financial 
engineering was the first thing to be added to Ilshin, because the backgrounds of Ilshin’s 
existing professionals were management consulting and operation. In 1996 and 1997, 
Ilshin recruited three professionals who had worked for investment banks and brokerage 
houses.  
Being confident of upcoming bullish stock market, Ilshin heavily invested in 
later-stage technology deals with secure exit within one year through IPO or trade sales. 
Turbo Tech (1996), Humax (1996), Dooin Electronics (1996), Hwang-kum ST (1997), 
and Samlip Precision (1997) were the representative deals done during this period.  
 
 
Investment in Cybertech Holdings 
 
Cybertech Holdings is a leading Internet security company specializing in e-
commerce infra-software including network security solutions, e-payment assurance 
solutions. Currently, Cybertech Holdings is leading the Internet security solution industry 
with 40% market share in the firewall segment and is also a major player in many other 
sub-segments of Internet solution.  
As Internet was widely diffused in Korea, security of data transmission 
through the Internet network became a critical issue, especially in the area of e-commerce. 
Sharing a vision on the future of Internet and e-commerce security business, a ground of 
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established off-line companies decided to fund the set-up of Cybertech Holdings in 
August 1995. TriGem Computer, a leading Korean computer manufacturer was the 
anchor shareholder that initiated the idea of establishing Cybertech Holdings. Ilshin was 
invited into the consortium because of its financial engineering and venture capital 
expertise. Ilshin acquired 5% of total 70 million outstanding shares at the price of par 
value. The other shareholders were Narae Telecommunication (TriGem’s affiliate, 10%), 
CJ (consumer goods, 5%), Taeyoung (major shareholder of SBS Broadcasting, 5%), 
Kyung Bang (textile and retailing, 5%), Isu Chemical (chemical products, 5%), and 
Nasan (apparel, 5%). 
The beauty of the deal was the strong growth strategy backed by synergetic 
shareholding structure. Every shareholder of the company was a leading company in 
various sectors, including information technology, computer, consumer products, 
construction, retailing, textile, apparel, broadcasting, and chemical. Ilshin identified value 
creation opportunities in coordinating the existing shareholders and adding new 
shareholders in other industries. Above all, the solutions of the company were 
competitive in terms of technology and price and the management team was experienced 
and well organized. 
Cybertech Holdings outperformed its competitors. Supported and advised by 
Ilshin, the company obtained joint venture license from Check Point Software 
Technologies, a globally leading developer of security solutions in Israel, and established 
a subsidiary company in the U.S. to be used a distribution arm. A key solution, firewall 
program specialized to stock trading system, was successfully developed. 
In 1996, Ilshin increased its shares to 6.67% by subscribing stock offering. 
Before the company was listed on the KOSDAQ in December 1999, Ilshin brought in 
Shinhan Bank for a pre-IPO investment, which later became a major client of the 
company. Total amount of Ilshin’s investment in the company was KRW 100 million, 0.1 
billion and the investment recorded 175.9%. 
 
 
4. Economic Crisis and Reorganization (1998 ~ 1999) 
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Opening of Private Equity Market in Korea 
 
Following the economic crisis in 1997, private equity market emerged in 
Korea as conventional debt and equity financing froze in overall market. Troubled with 
distressed portfolio companies, most Korean venture capital firms that had focused on 
high-tech companies of start-up and early stage nearly stopped new investments. 
However, foreign private equity investors with abundant capital were attracted to the 
Korean market by expected appraisal of Won currency and low valuation caused by 
temporality distressed situation. Main categories of targeted investments in this period 
were acquisition of spin-off companies from Chaebols and providing turnaround capital 
to mid-sized companies which were not affiliated to Chaebols. 
 
 
In Search of New Alternative 
 
After breakout of the economic crisis in 1997, Ilshin looked for alternative 
opportunities instead of investing in high-tech companies which was deemed to be 
extremely risky considering doubtful recovery of the Korean economy in the short term. 
The first targeted company sourced by Ilshin was Anam Instrument, one of the affiliates 
of Anam Group which had serious liquidity problem caused by aggressive capital 
expenditure through debt financing. Anam Group planned to sell controlling ownership of 
Anam Instrument to third party and approached potential investors. Proposed by HSBC, 
Ilshin formed a consortium with a subsidiary of HSBC dedicated to private equity 
investments in Asian regions and conducted in-depth due diligence on Anam Instrument. 
HSBC had extensive experiences in private equity investing in many Asian countries, but 
was unfamiliar with the Korean market. On the other hand, Ilshin had an established team 
of competent professionals with local experiences and knowledge, but did not have 
detailed procedures of private equity investing for later-stage companies. After Ilshin and 
HSBC completed due diligence on Anam Instrument, the deal was revoked by Anam 
Group due to their internal reasons undisclosed to potential investors. Nevertheless, Ilshin 
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experienced the whole process of private equity investing in later-stage companies 
through intensively co-working with HSBC. Afterwards, many other foreign private 
equity investors visited Ilshin from Wall Street, Hong Kong, Singapore, and London and 
some of them proposed Ilshin to co-manage private equity funds in the form of joint 
venture. AMP, the largest life insurer in Australia, was one of them who proposed joint 
venture to Ilshin. 
 
 
Strategic Alliance with Dacom 
 
Almost two years of Ilshin’s hibernation since 1997 ended with entering into 
strategic alliance with Dacom, a leading Korean company in telecommunication services 
and an affiliate company of LG Group. Targeting Internet-related businesses for growth 
in the future, Dacom planned to invest in early-stage companies in line with its strategies 
and to spin off some divisions promising as independent operations. Pressured by rapidly 
changing environment of Internet businesses, Dacom wanted to stabilize investment 
business in the short time frame and minimize trials and errors. To this end, additional 
capital to leverage on and expertise in nurturing start-ups needed to be sourced from 
outside. Dacom decided to form strategic alliance with an established venture capital firm 
by investing in limited partnerships and to make direct investments as a co-investor 
simultaneously. After strong competition with many venture capital firms, Ilshin was able 
to launch Ilshin & Dacom Investment Partnership in the late 1999. 
Ilshin tried advanced investment processes for Ilshin & Dacom Investment 
Partnership, such as advisory board and two-tier investment committee. Ilshin organized 
advisory board that consisted of executives at Dacom and industry experts from other 
limited partner companies. Each member of advisory board was asked for opinions on 
proposed investments from the point of strategic fit for the partnership, up-front value-
creation strategies, and conflict of interests with existing businesses of the limited 
partners. Investment decisions were made at two-tier investment committee. At the first 
investment committee, proposed investment was approved for in-depth due diligence so 
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that Ilshin minimize wasted time and efforts as well as professional fees paid to external 
advisors. Final decision was made at the second investment committee after reviewing 
results of due diligence and opinions of the advisory board. 
Ilshin shared overall procedures with Dacom’s direct investment team from 
deal sourcing to exit, and frequently teamed up with them for various projects such as 
market research. In order to source quality deals, Ilshin leveraged on Dacom’s business 
network and strong brand name which was appreciated by high-tech companies. 
Supported by Dacom, Ilshin categorized Internet businesses into sub-segments, listed up 
target companies in each segment, and approached them. Internet infrastructure of Dacom 
such as Internet data centers constituted incubation platform that provided differentiated 
and substantial assistance to early-stage companies engaged in Internet businesses. 
As a corporate investor, Dacom aimed at potential synergies with its strategic 
objectives rather than financial return on investment. To harmonize different interests of 
two parties, Dacom aligned compensation of its direct investment team with Ilshin, and 
Ilshin made two professionals exclusively responsible for the partnership. Throughout all 
the processes, Ilshin’s experiences across various industries and Dacom’s knowledge 
about Internet-related businesses were successfully mixed. Proposed by Dacom, Ilshin & 
Dacom No. 2 Investment Partnership was launched in 2000. 
 
 
5. Transformation to Private Equity Investor (2000 ~ Present) 
 
From January 1999 to March 2000, the KOSDAQ provided extraordinary exit 
opportunities to venture capital firms. The KOSDAQ index rose from 76.40 Point 
(January 4, 1999) to 283.44 Point (March 10, 2000), and the trading amount also 
exceeded Korea Stock Exchange. As almost every IPO at the KOSDAQ brought record 
high returns to investors, investments in pre-IPO high-tech companies became the most 
attractive opportunity. Many venture capital firms also got out of troubled situation, 
earning significant amount of capital gains from IPOs of portfolio companies. Numerous 
investors in various fields including conventional financial institutions and high-wealth 
individuals entered into venture capital businesses and invested mainly in later-stage 
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high-tech companies expecting short-term capital gain from IPOs. This resulted in ultra-
high valuation of later-stage high-tech companies. 
Ilshin was contrarian in this period as well. It continuously focused on 
investments in start-ups or early-stage companies through the partnerships managed with 
Dacom and new partnerships launched thereafter, and continued its efforts of value 
creation of portfolio companies. In addition, Ilshin decided to launch private equity funds 
to invest in mid-cap companies which are larger than typical late-stage companies that 
Korean venture capital had invested in so far, but smaller than large-cap companies that 
foreign private equity investors invested in. After extensive study and thorough 
preparation since 1999, Ilshin launched Henderson Korea Partners, L.P. (“HKP”) with the 
fund size of USD 34.6 million in 2001, which is the first private equity fund managed by 
Korean venture capital firms. HKP is jointly managed with AMP Group, and is named 
after AMP Group’s asset management subsidiary, Henderson Global Investors, to 
leverage on Henderson’s strong brand name. After launching HKP, Ilshin added two more 
main categories of investment to the existing high-tech, retail and movie sectors. Those 
are investing in controlling shares in mid-cap companies across various sectors and 
providing larger amount of expansion capital to high-tech companies competing in the 
global market. 
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Exhibit 3-1: Performance of Ilshin 
 
A.  IRR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Investment Amount, 1991-2003 1Q (Unit: KRW billion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  Investment of Ilshin by Sector and Stage (Unit: KRW Billion, %) 
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Exhibit 3-2: Limited Partnerships managed or advised by Ilshin (Unit: KRW billion) 
 
Year of 
Launch 
Name Size Major Limited Partners 
1990 Ilshin No. 1 Venture Investment Partnership 5.0 Sit/Kim International, Small Business 
Corporation, Shindong, Ilshin Spinning, 
Chohung Securities 
1993 Ilshin No. 2 Venture Investment Partnership 13.4 Bankers Trust New York 
1993 Ilshin No. 3 Venture Investment Partnership 9.3 Ilshin Spinning, Aekyung 
Petrochemical, Small Business 
Corporation 
1994 Ilshin No. 4 Venture Investment Partnership 20.0 Salomon Brothers Asia 
1995 Ilshin No. 5 Venture Investment Partnership 3.0 Itochu Corporation 
1995 Ilshin No. 6 Venture Investment Partnership 25.0 Capital Balanced Fund 
1995 Ilshin No. 7 Venture Investment Partnership 14.3 Capital Balanced Fund, Ilshin Spinning
1999 Ilshin & Dacom Investment Partnership 11.0 Dacom International, CJ, Humax, Small 
Business Corporation 
2000 Ilshin & Dacom No.2 Investment Partnership 10.3 LG Telecom, Doosan, Korean 
Government 
2000 Ilshin Animation Investment Partnership 5.0 Koko Enterprise, Korean Government, 
Korean Film Commission, Animation 
International 
2001 Henderson Korea Partners, LP 44.9 AMP Life, Koram Bank 
2002 Ilshin & Koko Contents Investment 
Partnership 
12.0 National Pension, SNU Foundation 
2003 2003 KIF-Ilshin IT Fund 16.0 Korea IT Fund 
 Total 189.2  
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Exhibit 3-3: Profile of selected professionals of Ilshin Investment Co. Ltd. 
 
 
Jeong-Suk Koh, President & CEO 
Dr. Koh has been President of Ilshin since 1991. Dr. Koh has been fundamental to the 
development and execution of Ilshin’s strategy. Prior to joining Ilshin, he worked at McKinsey & 
Co.’s Los Angeles office for two years as a consultant serving several Fortune 500 companies and 
major Korean conglomerates. Dr. Koh holds a BA from Seoul National University, an MS in 
Management Science from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and a PhD in 
Management from the Sloan School at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
 
Kwang-Hee Oh, Executive Vice President, Private Equity Investment 
Before joining Ilshin, Mr. Oh worked as Managing Director at National Information & Credit 
Evaluation Inc. (NICE), responsible for all of the firm’s credit rating and consulting businesses. 
Mr. Oh worked in the field of credit rating for over twelve years and provided numerous advisory 
services on restructuring and reorganization of financially distressed companies including Kia, 
Jinro, Daenong, Kabool and Nasan for the government and financial institutions. Mr. Oh holds an 
MBA from Claremont Graduate University and a BA from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 
Korea. 
 
Jong-Ho Park, Chief Investment Officer, Retail 
Mr. Park joined Ilshin in 1994 and has worked on various investment activities of Ilshin including 
leading Ilshin’s investment activities in the retailing sector. He has succeeded in establishing joint 
ventures with international brand companies such as Giordano and The Body Shop. Mr. Park was 
formerly a project manager and financial analyst with Korean AirLines Ltd. before he joined 
Ilshin. Mr. Park received his MBA degree from New York University and has a BA from Yonsei 
University.  
 
Mr. Sang-Uh Kim, Chief Investment Officer, Private Equity 
Mr. Kim was a senior investment officer for the Citicorp Capital Asia Limited and Citicorp 
Capital Korea Limited for four years, where his major role was a technology specialist in 
electronics, computers, and information areas. He also was in charge of all of Citicorp’s portfolio 
investment efforts in Korea with a major focus on the banking sector. His previous experiences 
include corporate finance and portfolio management and he served for another six years as 
product manager at Seoul branches of Citibank N.A. and Citicorp International Securities Limited. 
Mr. Kim earned BS in Computer Engineering from Seoul National University and studied at 
Pennsylvania State University. 
 
Hak-Beom Kim, Chief Investment Officer 
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Mr. Kim has worked on late-stage and pre-IPO deals since his joining Ilshin in 1999. He is 
currently involved in the management of Ilshin&Dacom Fund which invests in early-stage 
Internet companies. Prior to joining Ilshin, he was a manager at Samyang Merchant Bank for 4 
years with responsibility for investment banking, during which time he worked on international 
finance including loan syndication, funding through offshore vehicles and proprietary overseas 
investment. He has also worked on international technology transfer business at Samsung 
Corporation from 1993 to 1995. He obtained a BA degree from Korea University.  
 
Kang-Soo Lee, Senior Investment Officer 
Mr. Lee joined Ilshin in 2000 and has been involved in the management of Ilshin&Dacom Fund. 
Prior to Ilshin, he worked as a project engineer at Eli Lilly & Company from 1998. He 
participated in KORDIC, a government-owned scientific database institute, as an information 
provider for two years. He performed a research project on control engineering with the 
Government and KEPCO from 1996 to 1997. He received an MS from Korea Advanced Institute 
of Science and Technology and a BS from Korea University. 
 
Byung-In Kim, Investment Officer, Movie Sector 
Prior to joining Ilshin in 1999, Mr. Kim worked at McKinsey & Company in Seoul as a 
consultant for two and a half years. While at McKinsey, he was involved in various projects, such 
as long term strategy setting for a construction company, an aerospace M&A deal, restructuring of 
a Korean conglomerate based on chemical and heavy machinery manufacturing business, and 
evaluation of a new car development process. Mr. Kim received his BA degree from Korea 
University. 
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Exhibit 3-4: Performance of Giordano Korea 
 
A.  Company Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Comparison of Inventory Turnover 
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IV. CONCUSION 
 
 
1. Summary of Key findings 
 
Key findings of this study are summarized as follows. 
Venture capital is fund available for new or expanding business ventures with 
considerable growth potential and executable exit route. It is characterized by equity or 
quasi-equity participation, long-term investment, and on-going involvement in the 
investee company. Key factor of success for venture capital is long-term value creation of 
investee companies in conjunction with clear strategy for investment and divestment, 
efficient allocation of time and funds, strong network for deal sourcing, due diligence, 
and value-adds, and successful realization. 
Korean venture capital industry has significantly grown for the last thirty 
years. The recent development was based on enhanced entrepreneurship, activated exit 
market, and strong support of the government. Sudden increase of venture capitals and 
participation of other conventional financial institutions and corporates made the market 
competitive. Therefore, more sophisticated skills, more extensive networks, and more 
active and creative approach to opportunities are required. The further development of the 
industry is expected to come from evolution of exit mechanism, which is accompanied by 
a market for merger and acquisition. 
Since its foundation in 1990, Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. (“Ilshin”) proactively 
looked for alternative opportunities in retail and movie sectors to overcome unfavorable 
environment. Superior return in those two areas was definitely based on proactive value 
creation for and hands-on control of portfolio companies. 
With investment market for high-tech companies more competitive, Ilshin 
decided to move into less competitive battleground, mid-cap private equity market. 
Where intensive due diligence and felicitous value creation are critical to successful 
investment, its experience and accumulated expertise and network in divers sectors can 
differentiate itself from other players in Korea. 
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2. Management Implications and Recommendations 
 
The analysis of basic concept of venture capital, the Korean venture capital 
industry, and case of Ilshin provides a few general management implications and 
recommendations. To be successful over the long-term, venture capital firms should: 
 
1) have clear and long-term investment strategies with multiple sectors 
focused on, and continuously accumulate expertise and network based 
on pre-designed investment strategies. Considering limited sized of 
domestic market, strategies focused on a single sector are not 
recommended at the level of a firm unless a sector uniquely provides 
plenty of opportunities over the long term; 
 
2) be creative and contrarian in selection of sectors, approach to deal 
sourcing, design of deal structures, and finding exit routes; and 
 
3) be a complete insider of portfolio companies and bring expertise to 
portfolio companies. 
 i
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